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SEARCHING FOR THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD:
STOPS, SEIZURE, AND THE REASONABLE PERSON’S
WILLINGNESS TO WALK AWAY FROM THE POLICE
Desiree Phair
Abstract: A person is “seized” by an officer, and thus entitled to Fourth Amendment
protections, if a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Although courts must set a
standard for when a person has been seized by an officer, few real-world studies exist
regarding when individuals feel truly free to disregard the police. In addition, gathering new
data poses challenges. This Comment presents newly produced data sets and then explores
adjustments to the current reasonable person standard, arguing the advantages of focusing on
officer actions as opposed to the current focus on whether a defendant feels “free to leave.”
This Comment begins with an overview of the standards set by the United States
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Washington regarding when a reasonable person
would feel free to terminate a police interaction. Next, the Comment discusses nuances and
exceptions seen within other reasonable person standards. The Comment then reviews the
psychological and social science research regarding laypersons’ difficulty resisting authority
figures. David Kessler’s 2009 study—indicating that most respondents feel uncomfortable
refusing to cooperate with police, even during “social” interactions—receives in-depth
attention.
This Comment next presents an original study that asks two population samples the
Kessler questions. Neither result precisely mirrors the Kessler study result. Washington voter
survey respondents indicated a higher comfort refusing the police than hypothesized;
recovery center survey respondents provided a more bifurcated response pattern to the
standard questions and offered qualitative commentary regarding how disabilities may
impact an individual’s perceived freedom to leave an officer interaction.
Following the data analysis, the Comment discusses whether courts should add more
nuance to the existing reasonable person standard by accounting for potential vulnerabilities
within the civilian population. If courts follow this path, they would benefit from the ability
to review additional studies before finalizing such updates. The Comment ultimately argues,
however, that other jurisdictions should follow Washington’s lead and focus on objective
officer actions when determining whether a social contact has evolved into a seizure.
Focusing on officer choices will provide more predictable and socially just results than
delving into the subjective experience of a hypothetical “reasonable” suspect.

 J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Washington School of Law. M.A., Economics, California
State University Fullerton; M.A., Education, Claremont Graduate University. Thank you to
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During the summer of 2015, the author worked as an intern assisting with defense appeals,
including at least one appeal touching on the line between social interaction and seizure.

425

15 - Phair.docx (Do Not Delete)

426

4/5/2017 2:46 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:425

INTRODUCTION
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence encompasses the boundaries of a
search or a seizure, whether the police had probable cause to search or
seize, and the consequences if authorities search or seize without
probable cause—which typically includes exclusion of the improperly
obtained evidence.1 A seizure occurs when a reasonable person would
have, “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident . . . believed that he was not free to leave.”2 Phrased differently,
“[i]f a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then
he or she has not been seized.”3
Searches and seizures typically require a warrant; however, courts
have developed a plethora of exceptions to the warrant requirement,
including the following: (1) exigent circumstances,4 (2) “Terry”5 stops,
and (3) searches incident to arrest.6 The first exception, exigent
circumstances, covers urgent situations where waiting for a warrant
would increase the chance of harm or loss.7 For example, authorities
may enter a burning building without a warrant but require judicial
approval before entering charred building remains to search for evidence
of arson.8 The second exception, Terry stops, occurs when an officer
briefly interrupts an individual due to alleged suspicious activity;
warrantless searches are permissible but limited to a pat down frisk for
weapons.9 If police exceed that boundary, searching for items outside of
plain view that are clearly not weapons, courts must suppress the
evidence.10 Jurisprudence concerning the third exception, searches
incident to arrest, is an evolving doctrine that could itself fill an entire
paper, particularly given the number of abrogated United States Supreme

1. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231–32 (2011)
(explaining practical purpose of excluding evidence obtained via improper seizure).
2. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion).
3. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002).
4. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014) (referencing some case-by-case
warrant exceptions, including that for exigent circumstances).
5. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
6. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 234–35 (summarizing rule regarding search of an automobile incident
to arrest as outlined in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)).
7. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
8. Id. at 515–16.
9. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993).
10. Id. at 373 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65–66 (1968)).
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Court cases on the subject.11 In short, the risk of harm to officers and
destruction of evidence outweighs most arrestee privacy concerns
involving physical objects. Although the Court has typically supported
police leeway, it has firmly required the government to obtain a warrant
before searching mobile phones and the personal data therein when
conducting incident-to arrest-searches.12
While the above warrant exceptions focus primarily on issues related
to search, a “social” stop involves everyday police interactions that fall
short of formal detention, search, or arrest.13 Courts perform a factintensive analysis to determine whether a social interaction has morphed
into something more.14 A police officer commenting on the local sports
team or inquiring about the welfare of people sitting in a car is not
engaged in a “seizure”; on the other hand, a social contact is a
“voluntary, consensual encounter between the police and a subject with
the intent of engaging in casual and/or non-investigative conversation.”15
Courts must establish a seizure standard that maintains civilians’
rights while allowing officers to perform their duties.16 The courts
should not prevent police from making conversation or engaging in
community policing activities.17 Nonetheless, police must not disregard
official procedures under the guise of socializing with a suspect,18 and

11. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), abrogation recognized by Davis, 564
U.S. 229; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565 (1991); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), abrogation recognized by Davis, 564
U.S. at 229. In addition, many cases not abrogated are nonetheless not followed on grounds of state
law. See, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
12. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) (declining to extend United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
13. State v. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d 656, 664, 222 P.3d 92, 95–96 (2009).
14. See, e.g., id. at 666, 222 P.3d at 96; State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wash. App. 20, 22, 841 P.2d
1271, 1272 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thorn, 129 Wash. 2d 347, 917 P.2d 108
(1996).
15. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T MANUAL 6.220 (2015),
http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-6-arrests-search-and-seizure/6220-voluntary-contactsterry-stops-and-detentions [https://perma.cc/P4DJ-TMPK] (providing department policy for
voluntary contacts, Terry stops, and detentions).
16. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1980) (plurality opinion).
17. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY
POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7D44-VF9C] (labelling community policing “an approach that may very well
enhance and maximize performance and resources”).
18. For an extreme example of an officer blurring the line between official duties and socializing,
see People v. Becker, No. 52142(U), slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 2013).
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courts must indicate limits on what constitutes reasonable police
behavior in these contexts.19
In searching for the proper limits, courts may look to social science
and psychology research to support or weaken the justification for
maintaining the current seizure standard.20 New data sources could
illuminate whether the average person would indeed feel free to leave,
what fact patterns might lead ordinary individuals to insist on enhanced
protections—or, alternatively, when the average person might agree with
granting police more leeway.21
This Comment provides an overview of the seizure standards at the
federal level and within Washington State. Part I examines evidence (or,
in many cases, the lack thereof) supporting those state and federal
standards. Section I.A discusses the United States Supreme Court’s “free
to leave” variant of the “reasonable person” standard in detail. Section
I.B explores how the Supreme Court of Washington’s “free to leave”
standard aims to uphold the state constitution’s more restrictive privacy
requirements.22 Part II reviews existing legal frameworks for analyzing
and adapting the reasonable person standard in a variety of contexts. Part
III discusses previous studies relating to subjects’ willingness to
disregard actors in positions of authority, particularly the 2009 Kessler
study.23
The Comment’s next Parts introduce fresh data on individuals’
willingness to refuse the police, making recommendations regarding
potential future studies and adjustments to the reasonable person
standard. Part IV examines a telephone survey of registered Washington
voters who were asked questions nearly identical to those from the
Kessler study and then discusses data gathered from a smaller sample of
addiction recovery center clients. Part V compares the new data to the
2009 Kessler results, noting that the new data and Kessler data conflict.
Part VI suggests how researchers and courts should respond to this
recent social science research. Contrary to some earlier data, the newly
19. See Radley Balko, When the ‘Reasonable Police Officer’ Standard Isn’t Reasonable at All,
WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/12/17/
when-the-reasonable-police-officer-standard-isnt-reasonable-at-all/?utm_term=.696fb2b4446f
[https://perma.cc/V3YA-ZBA4].
20. See infra Parts II–III.
21. See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, A Judges’ Guide to Using Social Science, 43
CT. REV: J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N. 156, 156–63 (2007), http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/publications/courtrv/
cr43-4/CR43-4Monahan.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z26N-V2V9] (article contained within Issue 4).
22. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
23. David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure
Standard, 99 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 68 (2009).
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presented study indicates that many ordinary civilians feel comfortable
refusing to cooperate with a police officer during what the courts would
consider a “social” contact—but some subpopulations report feeling
fearful, and not all relevant subpopulations have been tested. If federal
or state courts wish to update the reasonable person standard to account
for challenges faced by vulnerable civilians, they should have the
opportunity to review additional data; unfortunately, gathering and
accurately explaining such data presents challenges. Instead, instructing
fact finders to focus on officers’ actions, rather than hypothesizing how
suspects should feel, will allow for more just outcomes when
determining whether a social contact has evolved into a seizure.
I.

THE “SOCIAL STOP” REASONABLENESS RULE PROTECTS
CIVILIANS FROM INTERFERENCE WHILE ALLOWING
POLICE TO PERFORM THEIR DUTIES

The judiciary must navigate the tension between protecting
individuals from unnecessary government intrusion and allowing
officers the freedom to engage in effective police work.24 The United
States Supreme Court has established that a show of force without
physical restraint constitutes a seizure when “a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave.”25 The Supreme Court of
Washington follows a similar “free-to-leave” standard but maintains that
the state constitution provides broader individual protections.26
A.

The Federal Standard Assumes that Most People Feel Free to
Walk Away from Law Enforcement

The United States Supreme Court free-to-leave standard sets a “high
bar for the kinds of encounters that qualify as ‘seizures.’”27 Laypersons
may face a number of situations in which courts retroactively label an
exchange with law enforcement “voluntary.” Distinguishing between
seizures and voluntary exchanges affects evidence admissibility and the
bounds of constitutionally acceptable policing.
The United States Constitution protects individuals from unlawful
searches and seizures.28 Specifically, the Fourth Amendment guarantees

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1980).
Id. at 554.
State v. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d 656, 664, 222 P.3d 92, 95 (2009).
See Kessler, supra note 23.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”29
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leaves the door open for an
evolving definition of seizure. Commenting on the reasonableness
standard and the lack of data regarding the average person’s definition of
seizure, Justice Scalia quipped during an oral argument, “Maybe we can
just pass [on defining the standard] until the studies are done?”30 During
the same oral argument, Justice Breyer elaborated:
So what do we do if we don’t know? I can follow my instinct.
My instinct is he would feel he wasn’t free because the red
light’s flashing. That’s just one person’s instinct. Or I could say,
let’s look for some studies. They could have asked people about
this, and there are none . . . . What should I do? . . . Look for
more studies?31
Judges have used their own instincts regarding what members of the
public consider reasonable and when an average individual feels
seized.32 According to the Court’s elaboration on the free-to-leave
standard, evidence of a seizure can include “the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of
voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be
compelled.”33 Consequently, the free-to-leave standard depends upon a
fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis.34
Scenarios involving officers interacting with airport travelers provide
concrete examples of the line between whether an individual is at liberty
or seized. When talking with plainclothes government agents who
“request” to see identification and ask a few questions, the Court
considers a passenger “free to leave.”35 In contrast, the Court considers
an individual seized when agents isolate the person in a room, retain a
passenger ticket and driver’s license, and specifically call out that the

29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (No. 06-8120)
(quoted in Kessler, supra note 23, at 51).
31. Id. (quoted in Kessler, supra note 23, at 51).
32. See Should Judges Use Instinct?, TRANSFORM JUSTICE (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.transformjustice.org.uk/should-judges-use-evidence-or-instinct/ [https://perma.cc/VV24
-RZGP].
33. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
34. See id. at 555.
35. Id.
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person is suspected of a crime.36 Declaring that a subject is literally or
effectively under arrest distinctly indicates seizure.37
The free-to-leave test hinges on whether a person would feel free to
cease interacting with law enforcement, not necessarily whether the
person would feel free to physically leave the area. The Court has ruled
that members of the public would feel free to end a conversation if
questioned on a public sidewalk or on a bus.38 In Florida v. Bostick,39 the
Court noted that the free-to-leave standard was an inappropriate test on a
Greyhound bus because a person on a bus would not feel free to
disembark regardless of the officer’s presence. “[T]he appropriate
inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”40
The Court more often assumes that police officers have seized a
person within a car because a traffic stop involves interrupting the mode
of travel.41
An officer who orders one particular car to pull over acts with an
implicit claim of right based on fault of some sort . . . . [E]ven
when the wrongdoing is only bad driving, the passenger will
expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and his attempt to leave
the scene would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection
from the officer that no passenger would feel free to leave in the
first place.42
The Court considers it sufficient for a seat-bound bus passenger to
feel free to decline an officer’s request despite a limitation on his
freedom to disembark, focusing on details such as whether the officer
used a quiet tone of voice,43 yet the test for a curb-bound car passenger
remains whether the person would feel free to leave the scene.44
The United States Supreme Court free-to-leave standard establishes a
challenging test—particularly for those in scenarios, such as traveling
36. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983).
37. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (holding that an individual allowing a
hotel room search after being told she should consider herself under arrest did not constitute the
suspect giving the officer voluntary consent).
38. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005).
39. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
40. Id. at 436. But cf. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000) (discussing the
unacceptable pressures to conform felt by non-religious audience members listening to a
loudspeaker prayer delivered at a school football game).
41. See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 257 (2007).
42. Id.
43. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002).
44. See Brendlin, 551 U.S. 249.
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long distances on a bus, not often experienced by members of the
Court.45 The Supreme Court of Washington standard, though still
connected to a free-to-leave analysis, attempts to provide greater
protections.46
B.

Washington Also Uses a “Free to Leave” Standard, but Its
Constitution Provides Somewhat More Protection than the Fourth
Amendment Protections Against Searches and Seizures

The Supreme Court of Washington has adopted a standard very
similar to the federal free-to-leave approach.47 The Washington State
Constitution, however, generally provides broader privacy protections
(and thus greater search and seizure protections) than those rooted in the
Fourth Amendment.48 Under the Washington Constitution “[n]o person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law.”49 This Washington clause “is not limited to subjective
expectations of privacy but, more broadly, protects ‘those privacy
interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to
hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.’”50
This privacy right feeds directly into an overall standard for what
constitutes a seizure: “a seizure occurs, under article I, section 7, when
considering all the circumstances, an individual’s freedom of movement
is restrained and the individual would not believe he or she is free to
leave or decline a request due to an officer’s use of force or display of
authority.”51 Washington courts aim to make this determination by
objectively looking at the actions of the law enforcement officer.52
Although similar to the federal standard, the Washington standard
reflects the state’s high regard for privacy and thus leads to more

45. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 58.
46. See, e.g., State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 694, 92 P.3d 202, 204 (2004); State v. O’Neill,
148 Wash. 2d 564, 584, 62 P.3d 489, 500 (2003); State v. Jones, 146 Wash. 2d 328, 332, 45 P.3d
1062, 1064 (2002).
47. O’Neill, 148 Wash. 2d at 574, 62 P.3d at 495.
48. See, e.g., Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d at 694, 92 P.3d at 204; O’Neill, 148 Wash. 2d at 584, 62 P.3d
at 500; Jones, 146 Wash. 2d at 332, 45 P.3d at 1064.
49. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
50. State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486, 494, 987 P.2d 73, 78 (1999) (quoting State v. Myrick, 102
Wash. 2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007)).
51. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d at 695, 92 P.3d at 204 (citing O’Neill, 148 Wash. 2d at 574, 62 P.3d at
495).
52. State v. Young, 135 Wash. 2d 498, 501, 957 P.2d 681, 682 (1998).
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protective outcomes in some cases.53 Treatment of passenger suspects
during a traffic stop provides an example of the differing levels of
protection provided by the federal free-to-leave standard as compared to
the Washington free-to-leave standard. When examining a passenger’s
right to suppress evidence taken from a traffic stop, the United States
Supreme Court in Brendlin v. California54 held that passengers are
(rightfully) seized along with the driver from the moment of the stop.55
Before Brendlin, the Supreme Court of Washington had ruled that,
unless officers have an articulable safety concern, passengers have an
affirmative right to walk away from a car that has been pulled over for a
traffic violation, and passengers may move to suppress evidence
gathered during a traffic stop on the basis of the police having no right to
detain the passenger in the first place.56
Attempting to provide heightened state constitutional protections still
requires drawing the line between socializing and seizing. In
Washington, a social contact “occupies an amorphous area in [the
state’s] jurisprudence, resting someplace between an officer’s saying
‘hello’ to a stranger on the street and, at the other end of the spectrum,
an investigative detention (i.e., Terry stop).”57 Not every conversation
between police officers and citizens constitutes a seizure, and optimal
law enforcement strategies may require interaction with individuals out
in public.58 However, escalating police conduct may transform an
interaction from a social contact into a seizure.59
State v. Harrington60 provides a classic example of contact escalation.
In the Harrington case, a single police officer hailed the defendant
without using his emergency lights or siren; the officer parked out of
53. See, e.g., Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d at 694, 92 P.3d at 204; O’Neill, 148 Wash. 2d at 584, 62 P.3d
at 500; Jones, 146 Wash. 2d at 332, 45 P.3d at 1064.
54. 551 U.S. 249 (2007).
55. Id. at 257.
56. State v. Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d 208, 970 P.2d 722 (1999), abrogated by Brendlin, 551 U.S.
249. As of this Comment, the Washington State Supreme Court has not reviewed a post-Brendlin
scenario in which a passenger asserts that the police have no right to detain him or her in the first
place. In the most recent prominent case on a somewhat related topic, State v. Flores, 186 Wash. 2d
506, 510–11, 379 P.3d 104, 107 (2016), officers were interacting with the pedestrian companion of
a known gang member; there was no automobile involved.
57. State v. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d 656, 664, 222 P.3d 92, 95 (2009); see also Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
58. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d at 665, 222 P.3d at 96.
59. See id. at 666, 222 P.3d at 96; State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wash. App. 20, 22, 841 P.2d 1271,
1272 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thorn, 129 Wash. 2d 347, 917 P.2d 108
(1996).
60. 167 Wash. 2d 656, 222 P.3d 92 (2009).
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sight, remained within Harrington’s field of view while approaching,
and asked for permission to speak to Harrington—all of which the Court
considered a social contact.61 The Court held that subsequent actions
“quickly dispelled the social contact, however, and escalated the
encounter to a seizure.”62 The non-exclusive factors that indicate
whether a seizure has occurred include the arrival of additional police
officers, the request to remove hands from one’s pockets, the display of
a weapon, the request to search or frisk, and the request for
identification.63 Of particular note, the Harrington Court cited cases in
which other jurisdictions held that the presence of multiple officers did
not constitute seizure,64 but it disagreed with these other jurisdictions
and held that a “second officer’s sudden arrival at the scene would cause
a reasonable person to think twice about the turn of events and, for this
reason [the second officer’s] presence contributed to the eventual seizure
of Harrington.”65
Similar to the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of
Washington has made it clear that labeling an interaction a “seizure” has
important consequences, holding that “[t]he exclusionary rule mandates
the suppression of evidence gathered through unconstitutional means.”66
Even during a Terry detention, police may not search beyond performing
a safety frisk for weapons, and courts exclude evidence gathered from
any search that goes beyond said frisk.67
Washington largely follows the federal reasoning for dividing a social
interaction from a seizure, but the state diverges from the federal
standard by providing more protection when the state deems necessary.68
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that the federal standard
focuses too much on the subjective defendant mindset and that courts
provide better guidance for police officers when focusing on objective
61. Id. at 665, 222 P.3d at 96.
62. Id. at 666, 222 P.3d at 96.
63. Id. at 667–68, 222 P.3d at 97; State v. Young, 135 Wash. 2d 498, 512, 957 P.2d 681, 688
(1998) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)) (accepting examples of
police actions likely resulting in seizure).
64. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d at 666, 222 P.3d at 96 (citing People v. Robinson, 909 N.E.2d 232,
243 (Ill. 2009); United States v. Jones, 523 F.3d 1235, 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Buchanon, 72 F.3d 1217, 1224 (6th Cir. 1995)).
65. See supra note 64.
66. State v. Garvin, 166 Wash. 2d 242, 254, 207 P.3d 1266, 1272 (2009) (discussing
unconstitutional seizure prior to arrest).
67. Id. at 249, 207 P.3d at 1270 (citing State v. Duncan, 146 Wash. 2d 166, 176, 43 P.3d 513
(2002)).
68. See Young, 135 Wash. 2d at 510, 957 P.2d at 687.
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police actions.69 The remainder of this Comment explores researchbased and normative arguments for other jurisdictions to embrace the
Washington approach and for refining the Washington “reasonable
person” standard to further clarify when a social interaction ends and a
seizure begins—and from whose perspective to draw the line.
II.

COURTS CAN PROTECT CIVILIANS BY INCLUDING
ALLOWANCES FOR DEFENDANTS’ PERSONAL
CHARACTERISTICS OR BY FOCUSING ON THE
REASONABLENESS OF POLICE ACTIONS TOWARD THE
CIVILIAN

This section explores current reasonable-person-standard exceptions
for persons with disabilities, children, and women, as well as
“reasonable actor” requirements applied specifically to police officers.
Tort law provides protection for persons with disabilities.70 Courts allow
special exceptions for child actors.71 Exceptions for the “reasonable
woman” also exist in some contexts, but receive harsh criticism from
multiple scholars.72 At times, rather than analyzing a civilian’s actions,
the courts provide protection to civilians by insisting on officer
reasonableness.73 This patchwork of exceptions and protections leaves
room for reinterpreting reasonable person standards as research and
society progress.
A.

Disabled Persons Face a “Reasonable Disabled Person” Standard
Rather than the More General “Reasonable Person” Standard

Although some scholars argue that individual actors should bear the
cost of their own good or bad “luck,”74 the prevailing tort negligence
standard adjusts for most disabilities. An actor “with a physical
disability is negligent only if the conduct does not conform to that of a
reasonably careful person with the same disability.”75 When considering
69. See id. at 507–10, 957 P.2d at 685–87 (criticizing the United States Supreme Court’s
reasoning and ultimately rejecting the subjective standard in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621
(1991)).
70. See infra sections II.A–B.
71. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 (2001).
72. See infra section II.C.
73. See infra section II.D.
74. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 84–87 (2001).
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(a) (AM.
LAW INST. 2010).
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whether an actor exercised due care, a jury may consider that person’s
physical disability, such as legs of differing lengths76 or blindness.77
Sudden incapacitation due to a physical condition such as heart attack or
epileptic seizure will also excuse otherwise negligent conduct.78 In
contrast, the people with mental illness or mental disability face the
same standard of care as a person of sound mind79—but scholars
advocate for updating the reasonable person negligence standard for
those with mental illnesses and mental disabilities as well.80 As
discussed later in this Comment,81 courts could draw on the rationale for
carving out a “reasonable disabled person” standard in the tort context
and similarly establish a “reasonable disabled person” standard in the
Fourth Amendment free-to-leave context.
B.

Children Receive Protection Under a Differentiated Standard

Children also frequently receive disparate treatment under the law.
“The law has historically reflected . . . that children characteristically
lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an
incomplete ability to understand the world around them.” 82 Courts may

76. See Sterling v. New England Fish Co., 410 F. Supp. 164, 166–67 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
77. Hill v. Greenwood, 100 N.W. 522, 524 (Iowa 1904).
78. See, e.g., Walker v. Cardwell, 348 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Ala. 1977); Goodrich v. Blair, 646 P.2d
890, 892 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 67 (Del. 1975); Watts v. Smith,
226 A.2d 160, 161–62 (D.C. 1967); Burns v. Grezeka, 508 N.E.2d 449, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987);
Holcomb v. Miller, 269 N.E.2d 885, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971); Freese v. Lemmon, 267 N.W.2d 680,
684 (Iowa 1978); Rogers v. Wilhelm-Olsen, 748 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Brannon v.
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 507 So.2d 194, 197 (La. 1987); Moore v. Presnell, 379 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Murphy v. Paxton, 186 So.2d 244, 246 (Miss. 1966); Storjohn v. Fay, 519
N.W.2d 521, 526 (Neb. 1994); Word v. Jones, 516 S.E.2d 144, 147 (N.C. 1999); Jenkins v. Morgan,
566 N.E.2d 1244, 1248 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Parker v. Washington, 421 P.2d 861, 866 (Okla.
1966); Van Der Hout v. Johnson, 446 P.2d 99, 102 (Or. 1968); Howle v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 344
S.E.2d 157, 159 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986); McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 155–56 (Tenn. 1995);
Witt v. Merricks, 168 S.E.2d 517, 518 (Va. 1969).
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11C (AM.
LAW INST. 2013) (“An actor’s mental or emotional disability is not considered in determining
whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is a child.”).
80. See, e.g., Kristin Harlow, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis: How Tort
Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733, 1735–36 (2007) (“To be
consistent and fair, mentally ill defendants should have a subjective standard for determining
liability that is consistent with their particular disability, just as a subjective standard is available for
defendants with physical disabilities.”); Harry J. F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort
Defendants, 19 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1995).
81. See infra section VI.B.1.
82. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 273 (2001).
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release children from contracts made before the age of majority.83 Tort
law across many states also makes exceptions for children, providing
that they should be compared to those of similar age and experience.84
More closely related to the Fourth Amendment issues raised in this
Comment, the United States Supreme Court recently declared in no
uncertain terms that children should face a different standard than adults
in the context of police interactions.85 Courts should not inquire into the
“actual mindset” of individual suspects, but courts and police must
recognize that “a reasonable child subjected to police questioning will
sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel
free to go . . . [C]ourts can account for that reality without doing any
damage to the objective nature of the custody analysis.”86 The Court
considers children’s special vulnerability “self-evident to anyone who
was a child once himself, including any police officer or judge.”87
This reasoning, from J.D.B. v. North Carolina,88 has potentially broad
implications. Although a “social” stop and a Terry stop both differ from
the formal Miranda89 custody discussed in J.D.B., arguably the three
may blur together as conversation turns to command turns to restraint.
The assumptions and logic applied to how to define custody bear a
distinct resemblance to the assumptions and logic concerning whether
police have “detained” a suspect as part of a Terry stop.90 Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence dismisses the assertion that having an existing
general safeguard eliminates the need for erecting more specific
protections, a proposition with analogies beyond Miranda custody
scenarios:
[T]he State and the dissent suggest that . . . the due process
voluntariness test independently accounts for a child’s
youth . . . . To hold, as the State requests . . . would be to deny

83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Unless a statute
provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until
the beginning of the day before the person’s eighteenth birthday.”).
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 10(a) (AM.
LAW INST. 2013) (“A child’s conduct is negligent if it does not conform to that of a reasonably
careful person of the same age, intelligence, and experience”).
85. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 271.
86. Id. at 272.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 261.
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
90. See generally Katherine M. Swift, Drawing a Line Between Terry and Miranda, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1075, 1083 (2006).
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children the full scope of the procedural safeguards
that Miranda guarantees to adults.91
Although the United States Supreme Court has done less to shield
individuals during investigatory stops than it has done to shield
individuals from interrogation,92 the “self-evident”93 fact that children
perceive the world differently than adults at least raises questions as to
what other categories may require protecting those with a distinctly
different worldview. Other potentially vulnerable groups may aspire to
similar, case-appropriate, individuated standards. In addition to the
exceptions for disabled persons, discussed above,94 some exceptions
account for ways that the female viewpoint may differ from the male
viewpoint.
C.

Feminist Theory Critiques the “Reasonable Woman” Standard

Despite some application of a “reasonable woman” exception,95
courts and scholars have struggled with the ways that a “reasonable
woman” may differ from a “reasonable man.”96 The reasonable woman
archetype has appeared, to mixed reviews, in cases concerning rape
(how much would the reasonable woman resist),97 domestic violence
(when might the reasonable woman feel threatened),98 and sexual
harassment (would the reasonable woman consider the environment
hostile).99 This Comment now turns to the ways in which scholars have
critiqued, and occasionally supported, using a standard differentiated by
gender.
The arguments for adopting a reasonable woman standard may be less
clear than those for adopting exceptions and protections for the disabled.
At least three different theories underlie the justification for a reasonable
woman standard.100 The first, “difference” theory, suggests that women
91. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 280–81 (Kenndy, J., concurring).
92. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966).
93. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 272.
94. See supra section II.A.
95. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d
811, 820 (N.D. 1983).
96. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987).
97. Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in
Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1401 (1992).
98. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988).
99. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
100. See Cahn, supra note 97, at 1401.
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as a group tend toward nurturing and morality, and thus women as a
group behave differently than men.101 This approach may suffer from
accepting the “compliments of Victorian gender ideology while rejecting
its insults.”102 A second and related theory, “difference-as-dominance,”
concerns the power relationships within a system that has historically
excluded female perspectives—and the importance of including
women’s experiences when setting policy today.103 The third theory,
critical race studies theory, challenges whether rules that exclude the
experiences of outsiders are ever truly “neutral.”104
Whatever the chosen theoretical underpinning, in the past, when men
have determined the outlines of the reasonable woman standard, scholars
have observed that the standard served as a paternalistic straightjacket
rather than as a layer of protection for women.105 For example, in
criminal law concerning rape, the test for whether the woman resisted as
much as a “reasonable” woman was developed by men “to protect other
men who, in their eyes, were wrongfully accused of rape.”106
Reasonableness standards in the areas of sexual harassment and
domestic violence had more female input at the outset, and thus suffer
from less bias regarding how women “should” behave.107
Scholars have also argued that the historical view of women as
emotional beings, perhaps incapable of rational thought, makes it
difficult to ever divorce a “reasonable person” standard from the
underlying “reasonable man” reference point.108 Yet, men have received
leeway when giving in to emotions in certain contexts, particularly
manslaughter of a female partner in the “heat of passion.”109 Some
feminists also note that using a reasonable man standard in sexual
101. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 96, at 798 (discussing the contrast between the struggle to
encourage consideration of every man and woman as an individual as opposed to the possibility of
making useful group characterizations).
102. Williams, supra note 96, at 807.
103. Cahn, supra note 97, at 1401; see also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Legal Perspectives on
Sexual Difference, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 213, 214–15 (Deborah
L. Rhode ed., 1990).
104. See Cahn, supra note 97, at 1401.
105. See id. at 1402.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 362
(2012).
109. Antonia E. Miller, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness of the Concept of Reasonableness
in the Context of Manslaughter Committed in the Heat of Passion, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
249, 249 (2010) (quoting Judge Cahill: “I seriously wonder how many men married five, four years
would have the strength to walk away without inflicting some corporal punishment.”).
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harassment cases with male victims tends to reinforce societal
stereotypes concerning masculinity, resulting in reduced protection for
men who do not conform to those stereotypes and who may be at the
most risk for sexual harassment.110
In light of the potential for misuse, courts may prefer to avoid a
“reasonable for the gender” standard. On the other hand, adapting a
blanket or modified version of any reasonable person standard can serve
useful social goals when approached from a normative (i.e., how
members of society should behave) rather than a positive (i.e., how
members of society do behave) perspective.111 One feminist normative
approach uses a standard of “reasonable care,” requiring a “conscious
concern for the possible consequences of our actions or inactions for
another person’s safety or health.”112 This standard may prove difficult
to apply to female defendants arguing that a particular stop actually
constituted a seizure, but it may form the basis for a “reasonable police
officer” standard, as discussed immediately below.
D.

Police Officers Face Particularized Standards for Acting as a
“Reasonable Person”

Although the United States Supreme Court has noted that a case-bycase approach may not always “provide a workable accommodation
between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment,”113 police officers nonetheless face many flexible,
reasonableness-based standards dependent on the totality of the
circumstances. For example, courts structure exceptions to the warrant
requirement based on the reasonableness of officers acting without a
warrant in the individual situation: “[t]o the extent dangers to arresting
officers may be implicated in a particular way in a particular case, they
are better addressed through consideration of case-specific exceptions to
the warrant requirement, such as the one for exigent circumstances.”114
Similarly, Wilson v. Arkansas115 refused to set exact parameters for
the “knock and announce” rule, holding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s
flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Reasonable Men?, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2012).
See generally Miller & Perry, supra note 108.
Id. at 365.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014).
514 U.S. 927 (1995).
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rigid rule of announcement.”116 Courts also judge the brief suspect
detentions during Terry stops reasonable or unreasonable based on the
overall set of circumstances.117 The Supreme Court analyzing a Terry
stop or a “knock and announce” interaction does not generally indicate
that keeping a defendant for thirty-one rather than thirty minutes will
destroy an otherwise constitutional action.118 On the contrary, courts
frequently employ Wilson’s flexible requirement, asking officers to use
professional judgment and evaluate the totality of the circumstances.119
The flexibility and reasonableness standards apply outside of the
officer exception context. For example, in a civil rights violation suit, an
officer loses qualified immunity if the officer’s actions do not meet an
“objective reasonableness” standard.120 Courts may apply the
reasonableness analysis to multiple stages of a police officer’s
interaction with a suspect, with the officer failing at any point. The
United States Supreme Court has explained that courts should examine
actions of government actors leading up to a seizure.121 One federal
appellate court has held that courts should “carve up the incident into
segments and judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was
reasonable at each stage.”122 The Supreme Court of Washington also has
indicated that officers should conduct themselves reasonably during
suspect stops.123
Courts may wish to extend the inquiry into officer actions to
additional scenarios.124 Because the police officer is the authority figure

116. Id. at 934.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (declining to adopt a specific time
limit for length of a stop, but holding that, on the facts of the case, a ninety-minute seizure was
unacceptable).
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395 (1997) (ruling that it was reasonable for
officers to enter a motel room without knocking when defendant might imminently dispose of
evidence); Coleman v. United States, 728 A.2d 1230, 1235 (D.C. 1999) (holding that police with a
warrant using a ruse to gain peaceful entry into a home acted reasonably).
120. See St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987)).
121. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (noting that actions leading up to a
suspect’s ceasing movement might in some circumstances indicate a tort rather than a seizure).
122. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994). But see Dickerson v. McClellan, 101
F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting the importance of only holding officers accountable for
knowledge they had at the time of the alleged civil rights violation).
123. State v. Young, 135 Wash. 2d 498, 512, 957 P.2d 681, 688 (1998) (noting with approval that
“[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, the deputy acted reasonably in seeking to renew his
contact with Young”).
124. See infra section VI.B.2.
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in a position of power in most officer-non-officer scenarios, formulating
standards to drive officer behavior may prove simpler and more effective
than attempting to measure or shape laypersons’ choices. As discussed
in Part III, below, instructing or encouraging laypersons to disregard
authority often proves unexpectedly difficult.
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES DEMONSTRATE LAYPERSONS’
DIFFICULTY REFUSING REQUESTS FROM AUTHORITY
Previous studies have demonstrated that civilians rarely feel free to
ignore authority figures. Researchers have conducted a number of
queries examining subjects’ actions when commanded by an official,
responses to requests from those in uniform, behavior adaptions when
warned in advance of rights, and willingness to interact with police, each
discussed in turn below. Electric shock experiments125 and experiments
testing laypersons’ reaction to those in uniform126 show that most people
comply with requests from authority figures. Studies covering warnings’
effect on voluntary consent further support that civilians tend to
acquiesce.127 Finally, a thorough study testing willingness to refuse
police indicates laypersons’ discomfort with avoiding officers.128
A.

Electric Shock Experiments Show that Individuals Tend to Do
What They Are Told

In a famous series of 1960s experiments (“the Milgram
experiments”),129 Stanley Milgram demonstrated the difficulty with
saying “no” to an authority figure. Milgram invited subjects to a lab to
train “learners” (actually actors playing a role) via shock treatment.130
Subjects administered shocks with progressively higher voltages when a
learner answered incorrectly; officials in lab coats insisted that subjects
continue with the experiment despite the agonizing pleas for help and
screams from the actors.131 The Milgram experiments show the degree to
which an ordinary person will comply with orders from authority
125. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 3–6 (1974).
126. See generally Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 47 (1974).
127. See, e.g., Illya Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects of Robinette on the “Voluntary”
Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 HOW. L.J. 349, 353–54 (2001).
128. See Kessler, supra note 23.
129. See MILGRAM, supra note 125.
130. Id. at 3–4.
131. Id. at 4.
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figures, with Milgram commenting that “[r]elatively few people have the
resources needed to resist authority. A variety of inhibitions against
disobeying authority come into play and successfully keep the person in
his place.”132
Milgram further observed that “values are not the only forces at work
in an actual, ongoing situation. They are but one narrow band of causes
in the total spectrum of forces impinging on a person.”133 In one
particularly noteworthy experiment variation, even when subjects signed
a contract with the “learner” stating that the learner had a heart condition
and could opt-out, sixteen of forty subjects shocked the learner to the
maximum voltage.134
Far from a historical relic, Milgram’s results have been replicated
within the last decade by social psychologist Jerry M. Burger:135
“[p]eople learning about Milgram’s work . . . point to the lessons of the
Holocaust and argue that there is greater societal awareness of the
dangers of blind obedience. But what I found is the same situational
factors that affected obedience in Milgram’s experiments still operate
today.”136 Modern researchers have attempted to answer what motivates
acquiescing to authority. One experiment using an implicit measurement
indicated that obeying orders actually reduced subjects’ sense of agency
(as opposed to reports of reduced agency, which may be motivated by
the desire to avoid punishment).137 A different update to the Milgram
experiments questions whether some dutiful behaviors originate from
fear rather than mere blind obedience.138 For one subject, an overseer’s
absence of emotion triggered fright without the need for yelling or a

132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Jerry M. Burger, Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?, 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 1 (2009), https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-64-1-1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/357B-D858].
136. Researcher Finds Most Will Inflict Pain if Prodded, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/05/AR2009010501173.html
[https://perma.cc/SC7U-EKPD] (quoting Jerry Burger).
137. Emilie A. Caspar et al., Coercion Changes the Sense of Agency in the Human Brain, 26
CURRENT BIOLOGY 585 (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.cell.com/current-biology/pdfExtended/S09609822(16)00052-X [https://perma.cc/KEV5-DWSP].
138. Michael Shermer, What Milgram’s Shock Experiments Really Mean: Replicating Milgram’s
Shock Experiments Reveals Not Blind Obedience but Deep Moral Conflict, SCI. AM. (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-milgrams-shock-experiments-really-mean/
[https://perma.cc/RY2Q-3TQL].
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show of weapons: “I didn’t know what was going to happen to me if I
stopped. He just—he had no emotion. I was afraid of him.”139
These insights are relevant to judges or laypersons who envision
certain default reactions when police confront a civilian. Taking into
account typical overconfidence in one’s own abilities140 and Milgram’s
experimental observations, judicial “gut” instincts and survey respondent
claims serve as an upper limit of the likelihood of resisting authority.
The “he had no emotion”141 note in the update to Milgram’s experiment
should also inform what constitutes “use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be
compelled.”142
B.

Experiments from Bickman and Bushman Show that People Follow
Instructions from Those in Uniform

In the years following the Milgram experiments, psychologists
explored factors that might affect authority figure influence. The impact
of uniforms received particular attention and validation.
Renowned psychologist Leonard Bickman ran an experiment testing
the effects of wearing a uniform.143 Passersby saw an ordinarily dressed
person, or a person dressed as a milkman, or a person dressed as a
security guard.144 Those asked by the “security guard” to pick up litter
complied significantly more often than those asked by an ordinarily
dressed person or a person dressed as a milkman.145 When Brad
Bushman ran an experiment with similar methodology but replaced the
security guard figure with someone dressed as a fireman, compliance
rates were also higher for requests from the fireman than they were for
requests from someone ordinarily dressed.146
139. Id.
140. Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carillo, Are We All Better Drivers Than Average?: SelfPerception and Biased Behaviour, CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH (Oct. 2002) (discussing a
preliminary model of testing our imperfect self-knowledge and noting the extensive psychological
literature concerning the propensity to consider oneself better than average).
141. See Shermer, supra note 138.
142. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion).
143. See Bickman, supra note 126.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see also Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 800–01 (2005) (discussing that
people presented with the fake security guard rarely failed to cooperate, regardless of how much
they insisted on their confidence level before the interaction).
146. See Brad J. Bushman, Perceived Symbols of Authority and Their Influence on Compliance,
14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 501, 506 (1984).
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Several years later, Bushman conducted a similar experiment testing
whether the status conferred by dress applied equally to female authority
figures. Bushman found a difference in compliance rates depending on
dress, with higher compliance when the woman issuing a command
wore a uniform as compared to the level of compliance when a woman
wore a suit or casual clothing.147 His work verified previous hypotheses
that uniforms are influential because they serve as a certificate of
legitimacy.148
Bickman and Bushman supplied valuable information regarding the
way laypersons respond to requests from those in uniform. Their studies
suggest that, when discussing civilian interaction with the police and the
likelihood that regular people will simply walk away in the middle of the
conversation, most people automatically comply with those utilizing the
“certificate of legitimacy.”149
C.

Warnings Regarding Rights Do Not Lower the Rate of Consent

The Milgram experiments show that laypersons tend to do what
authority figures tell them to do,150 but laypersons also conform to
officers’ wishes even when they are told explicitly that they may decline.
Although some choose to believe that informing a suspect of his or her
rights—the Miranda151 right to remain silent and the Robinette152 “right”
to refuse a search—will benefit suspects,153 research indicates no
significant effect of a warning on a subject’s tendency to allow police
intrusion.154 Perhaps the presence or absence of a verbal warning does
not explain the “subtle factors that may overcome the subject’s will.”155
In at least one study, willingness to allow a vehicle search increased

147. Brad J. Bushman, The Effects of Apparel on Compliance: A Field Experiment with a Female
Authority Figure, 14 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 459, 463 (1988).
148. Id. at 465.
149. Id.
150. See MILGRAM, supra note 125.
151. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
152. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (holding, contrary to the implication of the phrase
“Robinette warning,” that warnings prior to searching a vehicle are not required).
153. See Press Release, Am. Psychological Ass’n, Right to Remain Silent Not Understood by
Many Suspects: Confusion About Constitutional Rights Can Lead to Self-Incrimination,
Psychologist Reports (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2011/08/remainsilent.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y99T-P3PL] (“The public, police and sometimes courts wrongly
believe that people in custody understand their rights.”).
154. See Lichtenberg, supra note 127, at 374.
155. Id.
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after drivers received a Robinette warning.156 Sadly for those who hoped
that knowledge of one’s rights would empower the public, “[r]esearch
suggests that verbal warnings do not have any substantial impact on
consent or confessions.”157
Unfortunately, “observers outside of the situation systematically
overestimate the extent to which citizens in police encounters feel free to
refuse” consent.158 Further information is needed to establish how often
individuals will actually feel comfortable declining to interact with
officers. The Kessler study, discussed immediately below, contributes to
that conversation.
D.

Kessler’s Study Indicates People Do Not Feel Comfortable
Disregarding Police Questions

A 2009 study by David Kessler159 served as a primary inspiration for
this Comment (“the Kessler study”). Kessler collected data from a
sample of commuting adults to determine how free they would feel to
ignore a police officer who asked them questions on a sidewalk or while
riding a bus.160 He used a one-page questionnaire161 “distributed in four
locations in Boston on four different dates . . . .”162 Kessler’s surveyors
spoke with 406 individuals with an overall survey response rate of 36.6
percent.163 His sample over-represented people under age twenty-five
and under-represented non-White persons.164 Kessler describes surveyor
behavior as follows:
The surveyors were trained to use a standard prompt to ask
people if they wanted to participate and a standard response to
explain what the survey was about if people asked. Surveyors
were trained to let the respondents circle or write their own
answers; surveyors were to provide help only by saying that
“there are no right answers” and that the respondent should
“select whatever answer he thought made the most sense to
156. Id. at 367.
157. Id. at 374.
158. Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP.
CT. REV. 153, 156 (2002).
159. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 70.
160. Id. at 68. Eight Harvard Law School students conducted the surveys; half of the students
were female and all but one White. Id.
161. See infra Appendix A.
162. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 68.
163. Id. at 73.
164. Id. at 73–74.
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him.” Finally, surveyors were trained to track the number of
people who declined to complete a survey or who did not
respond in any way when asked, but they did not track the age,
race, or gender of those who declined. Surveyors were warned to
avoid favoring any particular demographic. Instead, they were
asked simply to talk to everyone in the area, including both
individuals and groups of people.165
Kessler acknowledges potential biases, including the possibility that
individual attitudes in the Boston area do not represent national attitudes
as a whole.166 Kessler also notes that the type of people who stop in
public, talk to a surveyor, and fill out a questionnaire may “be the type
of people who generally feel more compelled to do what other people
ask them to do.”167 Kessler minimizes these concerns, however, by
claiming “it is difficult to imagine that the situational forces surrounding
a law student’s request to complete a survey are similar enough to a
police officer’s request to answer questions that the sample, consisting
of people who are willing to stop for the law student, would be
significantly skewed.”168
Another potential problem that Kessler does not discuss in his
paper169 involves the use of mean (average) values. Although Kessler’s
questions one and two (regarding comfort refusing to interact with the
police on a sidewalk and comfort refusing to interact with the police on a
bus, respectively) provide five response options170 laid out
symmetrically in the styling of a Likert scale,171 the “somewhat free to
leave or say no”172 third option may have been insufficiently clear to
respondents, calling into question whether respondents perceived the
spacing between the answer options as a truly even interval. Without an
even interval between response options, responses are best treated as

165. Id. at 68.
166. Id. at 72.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See generally id.
170. For the reproduction of Kessler’s questions, see infra Appendix A.
171. A Likert scale is made up of a series of questions with response options often ranging from
one to five. See Christian Vanek, Likert Scale—What Is It? When to Use It? How to Analyze It?,
SURVEYGIZMO (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.surveygizmo.com/survey-blog/likert-scale-what-is-ithow-to-analyze-it-and-when-to-use-it/ [https://perma.cc/8RQE-8M2V].
172. See the reproduction of Kessler’s questions infra Appendix A.

15 - Phair.docx (Do Not Delete)

448

4/5/2017 2:46 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:425

ordinal173 data, and hence discussing mean values is a non-preferred
method of reporting and analysis.174 Furthermore, while Kessler
considers the response options for his third question175 as ordered from
highest to lowest obligation,176 some readers may view the response
categories as not on the same spectrum of rights versus obligations, and
thus these responses may not be properly ordinal. In light of these
concerns and the degree to which the Washington questions replicate the
Kessler questions, means will not be calculated or compared for the
Washington study discussed below.177
The Kessler study finds that the vast majority of respondents
expressed at least some discomfort with ignoring a police officer’s
questions: “[a]s the distribution of responses in both
scenarios . . . shows, about half of the sample selected [option one] or
[option two], and almost 80% selected [option three] or less.”178 Because
Kessler’s results so clearly indicate respondents’ discomfort with
refusing police questions, Kessler suggests alternatives to the United
States Supreme Court’s reasonable person standard, such as adopting a
more fact-specific or narrowly tailored reasonable person standard, or,
alternatively, modifying the perspective from which courts consider
reasonableness (e.g., analyzing the scenario from the perspective of a
model citizen or model police officer).179 Both approaches are discussed
further below.180
IV. NEWLY GATHERED DATA SUGGEST MORE COMFORT
REFUSING THE POLICE THAN FOUND IN KESSLER’S
STUDY
The current project focuses on the following goals: generate a small
batch of data; compare that data with the Kessler study;181 and suggest
173. What Is the Difference Between Categorical, Ordinal and Interval Variables?, UCLA INST.
DIGITAL RES. AND EDUC. (Jan. 14, 2006), http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/
whatstat/nominal_ordinal_interval.htm [https://perma.cc/4MRL-3CYU].
174. Jim Frost, Choosing Between a Nonparametric Test and a Parametric Test, THE MINITAB
BLOG (Feb. 19, 2015), http://blog.minitab.com/blog/adventures-in-statistics/choosing-between-anonparametric-test-and-a-parametric-test [https://perma.cc/TQF5-6R4E].
175. See infra Appendix A.
176. Kessler, supra note 23, at 70.
177. See infra Part IV.
178. Kessler, supra note 23, at 75.
179. Id. at 84–85.
180. See infra Part VI.
181. See generally Kessler, supra note 23.
FOR
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hypotheses worth testing with future, more sophisticated sampling.
Time, funding, and personnel were limited. To that end, the researcher182
attached questions to a statewide telephone poll conducted by
professionally trained interviewers183 collecting responses from a
random sample of Washington voters. The researcher then took those
same questions and personally collected responses from a small, targeted
sample: clients at a Seattle addiction recovery center.184 The random
sample of Washington voters produced different responses than the
targeted sample of persons recovering from addictions.185 Neither set of
responses mirrors the results from the Kessler study. 186 Below, the
Comment first lays out findings from the telephone poll and the recovery
center survey, then compares those findings with the Kessler study.
A.

A Telephone Survey of Washington Voters Indicates More
Boldness than Seen from the Kessler Study Respondents

Most respondents in the present study reported comfort ignoring the
police. The sample over-represented older, White members of the
overall population,187 but non-White respondents’ answers did not seem
to markedly differ from White respondents’ answers. More people than
expected (27% of all respondents and 38% of respondents making more
than $100,000 per year) claimed to have been stopped by police for
reasons other than traffic stops.188
Answers to question one, regarding refusing to answer questions
when stopped on the sidewalk, as well as question two, regarding
refusing to answer questions while on a bus, both produced more
responses indicating comfort with ignoring the police when compared to
the 2009 Kessler study.189 Washington voters’ comfort refusing the
police did not always align with their sense of obligations and rights.
Respondents expressed relative comfort talking with police, but many

182. References to “the researcher” throughout this paper refer to the author.
183. See Methods & Services, ELWAY RESEARCH, INC., http://www.elwayresearch.com/
services.html [https://perma.cc/SBX8-MEXT].
184. Many thanks to the staff and members at Seattle’s Recovery Café. For more information on
that organization, see RECOVERY CAFÉ, https://recoverycafe.org/ [https://perma.cc/J56D-V5ZQ].
185. See infra Part V.
186. Compare supra section III.D, with infra Part V. See generally Kessler, supra note 23.
187. For information regarding voter survey methodology, see infra Appendix C.
188. See infra Appendix B. Data on file with author.
189. See infra section V.A. Data on file with author.
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reported believing they have at least some obligation to interact or else
face unfortunate consequences.190
B.

The Survey of Seattle-Based Recovery Center Clients Provided
Further Surprises, Tracking the Kessler Study in Some Respects
but Adding a Qualitative Twist

Unlike the wide, random sample pursued above, the survey of
recovery center clients took the same questions and solicited responses
from a purposive191 group of individuals who have undergone extreme
experiences and taken steps to seek stability. The researcher spoke with
this group “in order to develop a richer, more in-depth understanding” of
how an outlier case might respond to police.192 Some respondent clients
face issues such as homelessness, substance abuse, and mental illness,193
and the researcher suspected these challenges may affect this
subpopulation’s perceptions of police and freedom to leave a
conversation. Recovery program membership ensured that respondents
could answer in a safe, sober space, allowing maximum ability to
participate.194
This particular center served as a convenient place to sample one
cluster of a target population; using volunteer respondents added an
additional layer of convenience rather than randomness.195 Future studies
may aim for a broader, more random set of participants from within this
target group.

190. See infra section V.A. Data on file with author.
191. For an explanation of selecting a non-probability sample based on population characteristics
and study purpose, see Ashley Crossman, Understanding Purposive Sampling: An Overview of the
Method and Its Applications, ABOUT.COM (May 13, 2016), http://sociology.about.com/od/Types-ofSamples/a/Purposive-Sample.htm [https://perma.cc/W289-5KNZ] (discussing variants of purposive
group sampling).
192. D. Cohen & B. Crabtree, Extreme or Deviant Cases, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION
(July 2006), http://www.qualres.org/HomeExtr-3808.html [https://perma.cc/TK9C-KKYL].
193. See About, RECOVERY CAFÉ, https://recoverycafe.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/TMN82LGD].
194. Id.
195. See Ashley Crossman, Convenience Sample: A Brief Overview of the Sampling Technique,
ABOUT.COM (June 10, 2016), http://sociology.about.com/od/Types-of-Samples/a/ConvenienceSample.htm [https://perma.cc/3G8B-TSC6].
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The Recovery Center Survey Drew from a Sample Demographically
Different from the Washington Voter Survey and Allowed for
Unexpected Qualitative Elements

The recovery center survey output exceeded that intended based on
the planned methodology.196 This raised potential analysis challenges
and questions for future research.197 This section will discuss respondent
demographics and then address the unique character of particular
responses.
The recovery center survey sampled a more demographically diverse
group than did the Washington voter survey.198 Of the recovery center
respondents, 53% indicated male gender and 60% indicated Caucasian
race.199 Other races included African American (10%), Asian (7.5%),
and Mixed Race (7.5%). A high percentage (75%) of respondents
indicated experiencing a stop other than a traffic stop.200
The small group survey environment increased the likelihood that
respondents would talk with each other or with the researcher.201 Many
respondents verbally reported learning disabilities, and at least one
respondent reported blindness.202 The researcher opted to avoid the
chance of bias from not including these perspectives rather than avoiding
the potential bias from explaining the words on the survey form or
allowing a respondent’s friend to read the form aloud.203 Some of the
respondents made written or verbal comments.204 Anecdotes about
relevant life experiences stood out in the moment, alerting the researcher

196. See infra Appendix D.
197. Qualitative research interactions commonly involve such evolution. See CHAVA
FRANKFORT-NACHMIAS & DAVID NACHMIAS, RESEARCH METHODS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 292
(5th ed. 1996) (“Data analysis in qualitative field research is an ongoing process . . . . As the
research progresses, some hypotheses are discarded, others are refined, and still others are
formulated.”).
198. See supra section IV.A.
199. See infra Appendix B. Data on file with author.
200. Id.
201. See infra Appendix D.
202. See infra section IV.B.2.
203. Communication barriers reduce response rates. See Ann Bowling, Mode of Questionnaire
Administration Can Have Serious Effects on Data Quality, 27 OXFORD J. PUB. HEALTH 281, 281–
91 (2005), http://jpubhealth.oxfordjournals.org/content/27/3/281.full [https://perma.cc/Q88J-NNF8]
(“The lower the response rate to a study, the greater the danger that the responders may differ from
non-respondents in their characteristics, which affects the precision (reliability) of the survey’s
population estimates, resulting in study bias, and weakening the external validity (generalizability)
of the survey results.”).
204. See infra section IV.B.2.
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to capture this unsolicited qualitative data as accurately and as soon as
possible.205
Due to the differences in collection methods and sample size, the
telephone survey and the recovery center survey results cannot be
combined and, in some respects, may be difficult to compare.206
Although certain members of the population are statistically more likely
than others to vote,207 the telephone survey of Washington voters
nonetheless featured a larger and more random sample than the recovery
center survey.208 Yet the information communicated by the addiction
center respondents was richer and thus potentially more illuminating
than that gathered during the more standardized telephone survey
process.209 During the recovery center survey, the researcher acquired
not only responses, but also some reasons behind those responses.210
In Part V, this Comment explains any indications that the Kessler
study, the telephone survey, and the recovery center survey point in
similar directions. It also discusses how the results generally compare.
That discussion, and the recommendations in Part IV, draws in part upon
unsolicited comments from recovery center survey respondents, the
topic discussed immediately below.211

205. See FRANKFORT-NACHMIAS & NACHMIAS, supra note 197, at 291–92 (“When researchers
cannot overtly document observations, they must use devices to help them remember events as they
occurred so they can be fully documented at the earliest possible opportunity.”).
206. While it is possible that the Wednesday and Friday experiences differ enough that the data
could be considered separately, no evidence indicates categorically different attendees on one day
versus the other. Given the relatively small sample size and the known presence of multiple clients
present on both days, the researcher has opted to present combined information from Wednesday
and Friday.
207. Voter eligibility, voter registration, and voter turnout differ; overall, Whites tend to vote at a
higher rate than many other groups. See Voter Registration Data, WASH. SECRETARY OF STATE
(Jan. 31, 2016), http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/vrdb/vrdbfaq.aspx [https://perma.cc/24HQFQTW] (“Approximately 80% of the state’s voting eligible population is registered to vote,
according to the statistics gathered by Michael P. McDonald’s United States Elections Project in
2014.”); Jens Manuel Krogstad, 2016 Electorate Will Be the Most Diverse in U.S. History, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/03/2016-electoratewill-be-the-most-diverse-in-u-s-history/ [https://perma.cc/65AC-ZXSY] (“In the 2012 presidential
election, 64% of non-Hispanic white eligible voters cast ballots, as did 67% of black eligible voters.
By comparison, the voter turnout rate was 48% among Hispanics and 47% among Asians.”).
208. Compare infra Appendix C, with infra Appendix D. Data on file with author.
209. Compare infra section V.A, with infra section IV.B.2.
210. See infra section IV.B.2.
211. As an aside, the extra information revealed during the recovery center conversations may
inform the best way to structure future research efforts. For example, a series of semi-structured
interviews or focus groups discussing the reasonable person standard would allow for follow-up
questions and exploration of what motivates attitudes, perhaps contributing more or different
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Recovery Center Respondent Comments Show Mixed Feelings
Regarding Empowerment and Trust When Interacting with
Authority Figures

A few participants shared unsolicited written comments on their
survey response forms.212 The written comments provided some limited
information but were less revealing than verbal discussions. The written
comments split along confidence lines. For example, in the section
relating to sidewalk stops,213 one participant wrote, “I have a schedule to
keep.”214 Other participants expressed more deference to or distrust of
police or other authority, including the following: (1) “No rights on a
metro bus;”215 (2) “I was arrested for refusing to talk to an officer
responding to a 911 call to my home;”216 and (3) “‘You have a legal
right to ignore the officer, but he may assume you are guilty of
wrongdoing if you do’ is my true answer, but ‘You have the legal right
to refuse to talk with the officer with no consequence to yourself’ is how
it should be.”217
Some participants also opted to make verbal comments, engaging in
conversation with the researcher or making comments while exiting.218
The researcher attempted to preserve the commenter’s phrasing as
accurately as possible.219 Verbal comments fell along a spectrum from
empowerment to fear.
The empowerment comments included the following: (1) “I’m blind.
If someone asks me a question I don’t want to answer, I just don’t say
anything. A lot of times they assume I’m deaf too and leave me
alone,”220 (2) “I believe I have a moral duty to help police in most

information than another round of randomized surveys. For further discussion, see infra Parts V and
VI.
212. See supra section IV.B.1; infra Appendix D.
213. See infra Appendix B. Data on file with author.
214. Personal communications with recovery center survey respondents, by handwritten
comments on paper forms, in Seattle, WA (Oct. 28, 2015) (on file with author).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See supra section IV.B.1; infra Appendix D.
219. Recording actual statements as nearly as possible, rather than attempting to record summary
impressions, minimizes “cultural” phrases that could include a researcher’s biases. See CAROLYN
FRANK, ETHNOGRAPHIC EYES 6–7 (1999).
220. Personal communications with recovery center survey respondent, by verbal comment, in
Seattle, WA (Oct. 28, 2015).
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situations but not a legal duty,”221 (3) “No one has a right to interrupt me
if I’m on my way somewhere important, not even the police. I just keep
walking,”222 and (4) “Am I being detained? I just keep asking that until I
get a straight answer. If I’m not being detained, they have to let me
go.”223
Comments about subordination by authority figures included the
following: (1) “I refuse to ride transit. I don’t care how many miles I
have to walk. I’ve got no rights once I step onto a bus,”224 and (2) “It’s
all fine and good to talk about my legal right to not cooperate. That
won’t help me when I’m lying on the sidewalk with a police boot on my
head.”225
The fearful comments included the following: (1) “With all the news
on TV about police shooting people, especially Black people, I wouldn’t
feel safe just walking away,”226 and (2) “I have disabilities, but they’re
not obvious to someone walking down the street. Being handcuffed
might break my wrists, and being pushed to the ground might break my
hip. If I break my hip again, the doctor says I’ll be stuck in a wheelchair
probably for life. I’m terrified of the police. They don’t understand how
strong they are and how easily they could hurt me. If they stop me, I’ll
tell them whatever they want to know.”227
The last comment above raises a poignant issue regarding disability
protections.228 Not all disabilities necessarily lead to a sense of
powerlessness—see the first comment in the “empowerment” batch
above—but certain conditions may make “freedom to leave” a farce.
Just as knowing that civil tort suits exist does not necessarily reduce fear
during an assault,229 the ability to sue the police for a civil rights
violation after the fact230 (assuming one even learns of the option) may
not prevent a person with disabilities from feeling seized and vulnerable
during a police interaction.

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra section II.A.
229. Indeed, without reasonable apprehension of bodily harm at the moment of the alleged
assault, a plaintiff cannot prevail when bringing a civil assault suit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 21 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
230. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 601 (1989).
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As discussed earlier, legal standard accommodations for those with
disabilities already exist.231 Adjusting the seizure standard in response to
disabilities or other vulnerabilities receives more attention below.232
V.

THE KESSLER, WASHINGTON VOTER, AND RECOVERY
CENTER SURVEYS SHOW DIVERGING TRENDS BUT
INDICATE A POSSIBLE GENDER DIFFERENCE

The overall results of the Kessler, Washington voter, and recovery
center surveys point in different directions; the Kessler study shows
discomfort interacting with the police whereas the newer surveys
indicate higher comfort levels. The Washington voter survey shows high
comfort levels from respondents of both genders.233 The Kessler study
and the recovery center survey results, however, indicate a possible
difference between the willingness of women and men to refuse police
interactions.234
A

Overall Responses from the Kessler Study, the Telephone Survey,
and Recovery Center Survey Diverge

The Kessler study responses, discussed in greater detail below,
indicate discomfort interacting with the police.235 Responses from the
Washington voter telephone survey indicate a higher comfort level and
willingness to terminate interactions with police.236 The recovery center
survey outcome is more opaque, with respondents divided.237
First, the Kessler study responses, below, show a distribution clearly
indicating discomfort with refusing to respond to police questions on a
sidewalk (question one) or on a bus (question two).238

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See supra section II.A.
See infra section VI.B.1.
See infra Figure 5.
See infra Figures 4, 6.
See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figure 2.
See infra Figure 3.
Kessler, supra note 23, at 74–75.
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Figure 1:
Kessler’s Distribution of Responses to Questions 1 and 2

Next, the Washington telephone survey of voters suggests the
opposite result—but one could argue whether respondents selecting
option three should be treated as uncomfortable, neutral, or
comfortable.239 Kessler’s survey form labeled option three as
“somewhat free to leave or say no” and treated this wording as
indicating some level of discomfort,240 whereas this researcher believes
option three may indicate neutrality or perhaps a positive lean.241 In any
case, those choosing options four and five in the Washington telephone
survey outnumber those choosing options one and two.242

239. See supra section III.D.
240. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 75.
241. For a more detailed discussion of issues with the wording in question three, including the
“somewhat free to leave” phrasing, see supra section III.D.
242. See infra Figure 2.
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Figure 2:
Washington Telephone Survey:
Responses to Questions 1 and 2

Finally, the survey of addiction recovery center patrons produced a
bifurcated set of responses.243 Given the small number of respondents
selecting option four, however, the answers weigh more toward
indicating discomfort with refusing to respond to police questions.244

243. See infra Figure 3.
244. Id.
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Figure 3:
Addiction Recovery Center Patron Survey:
Responses to Questions 1 and 2

B.

Women May Feel Less Comfortable Refusing the Police than
Do Men

Kessler’s study provides some evidence that women may feel less
comfortable refusing to interact with police than men typically feel.245
The Washington voter survey shows the opposite result.246 The recovery
center survey responses, however, follow the Kessler pattern.247
Kessler’s study did not produce results supporting or refuting the idea
that racial minorities might feel less comfortable refusing the police, but
Kessler did notice a pattern related to respondents’ status as young or
female.248 He postulated this may relate to vulnerability, stating that the
“coercive pressure of police encounters”249 led to the result that “groups
generally expected to feel especially vulnerable—the young and
women—would in fact feel less free to leave in the face of police
authority.”250

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See infra Figure 4.
See infra Figure 5.
See infra Figure 6.
Kessler, supra note 23, at 75–76.
Id. at 77.
Id.
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Figure 4
Kessler Comparison of Male and Female
Responses to Question 1251

The Washington telephone survey of voters did not indicate that
women experience more discomfort refusing the police than do men.252
If anything, the telephone survey results indicate a slightly higher
likelihood that women would choose response five, “Completely free to
leave or say no,”253 although the difference is not statistically
significant.254

251. Due to space concerns, this Comment compares answers to question one across the three
surveys. Comparing the answers to question two across the three surveys strongly mirrors the
comparison between question one answers.
252. See infra Figure 5.
253. See infra Appendix B.
254. Compare this with the result from women in the recovery center survey. See infra note 255.
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Figure 5:
Washington Voters, by Sex,
Responses to Question 1, Sidewalk Scenario

In contrast, the addiction recovery center survey showed male respondents
significantly more likely to indicate comfort refusing the police.255
Figure 6:
Addiction Recovery Survey, by Sex, Question 1, Sidewalk Scenario

255. The proportion of female respondents selecting responses four or five differed from the
portion of male respondents selecting responses four or five; the result was statistically significant,
with a p-value of less than 5%.
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Rather than verifying Kessler’s 2009 findings,256 the new data sets
instead prompt further questions, answerable only with more extensive
research. For example, the field would benefit from a study with a
sample of minority respondents large enough to draw meaningful
conclusions.257 Questions also remain as to whether the impetuousness
or fragility of youth prevails during police interactions.258 Finally, the
recovery center survey process highlighted unexpected information
regarding those with disabilities, providing some conflicting information
but triggering troubling possibilities.259 Further investigation is
warranted. A more extensive discussion of future research possibilities
follows.
VI. NEXT STEPS: EFFECTIVELY UPDATING THE REASONABLE
PERSON STANDARD REQUIRES GIVING JUDGES ACCESS
TO MORE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, BUT SWITCHING
TO A REASONABLE OFFICER STANDARD MAY
ACCOMPLISH MORE
When determining the standard for when officers have seized a
civilian, courts must balance the goals of protecting individual liberties
and allowing officers to efficiently fight crime.260 The seizure standard
should account for real-world circumstances, including demonstrated
patterns of laypersons acquiescing to authority figures.261 Unfortunately,
acquiring new data regarding civilians’ attitudes about police
interactions poses difficult challenges for researchers.262 To the extent
that the courts wish to update the reasonable person “free-to-leave”
standard to increase fairness for vulnerable populations, judges should
have the opportunity to review additional psychological and social
science research. Switching the seizure standard to exclusively focus on
officer actions, however, may produce superior results.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Compare section III.D, with Part V.
See Kessler, supra note 23, at 73.
See infra section VI.A.
See supra section IV.B.2.
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1980) (plurality opinion).
See Kessler, supra note 23, at 82–83.
See supra Parts IV, V.
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If Judges Wish to Continue with the Existing Reasonable Person
Standard, They Should Have the Opportunity to Review More
Social Science Research, Particularly Focusing on Young
Minorities and Disabled Persons

This researcher’s studies, discussed above, did not provide clear
answers regarding youth or racial minorities’ opinions.263 Non-White
individuals under age thirty-five require further study.264 Studies thus far
have not indicated a difference in comfort refusing the police based on
race, but those efforts have not surveyed many persons of color,
particularly young persons of color.265 Given well-publicized problems
with police engagement within minority communities,266 one may
continue to hypothesize that a young Black man or woman will feel
different about a police stop than an older White man.
Finding a robust sample of a young population is challenging.267 High
schools contain large groups of minors, but interacting with minors
triggers more stringent human research restrictions.268 Community
college students or four-year college students do not represent an
263. See supra sections IV.A, IV.B.
264. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 73 (“It will not be possible to determine the effects of [White
respondent] selection bias until subsequent research explores similar questions in other
populations.”).
265. Some early experiments did not even record racial identifiers. See, e.g., MILGRAM, supra
note 125, at 14 (drawing volunteers from the general population of New Haven, seeking a diversity
in “class backgrounds” but failing to even note race or ethnicity of participants). According to the
1960 United States Census, New Haven’s population was 90.1% Caucasian. Campbell Gibson &
Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by
Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States 39
tbl.7 (U.S. Census Bureau Population Div., Working Paper No. 76, Feb. 2005),
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076/CTtab.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
J66A-6XJA]. For a more recent experiment that did not shed light on racial differences, see Alisa
M. Smith et al., Testing Judicial Assumptions of the “Consensual” Encounter: An Experimental
Study, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 285, 302–03 (2013) (finding no difference between respondents of
varying races, but surveying only fourteen persons who self-identified as a race other than
Caucasian).
266. See, e.g., Rebecca Kaplan, How Do Police Improve Relations with Minority Communities?,
CBS NEWS (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/are-police-doing-enough-to-improverelations-with-minority-communities/ [https://perma.cc/L4WY-XXFH].
267. Paul R. Amato, Life-Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents’ Divorce, 4 CHILD. &
DIVORCE 143, 144 (1994), http://futureofchildren.org/publications/journals/article/index.xml?
journalid=63&articleid=415&sectionid=2839 [https://perma.cc/QW9D-QY6S] (“Unfortunately,
these types of samples [(random samples of children)] are also the most difficult and expensive to
obtain.”).
268. See, e.g., Requirements for Permission by Parents or Guardians and for Assent by Children,
45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (2009), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/45-cfr46/index.html#46.408 [https://perma.cc/FQ2Y-45EH].

15 - Phair.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

SEARCHING FOR THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD

4/5/2017 2:46 PM

463

unbiased sample of the total population,269 and attempting to focus on
campus subsets, such as race-themed organizations, can lead to further
selection bias.270
Despite these complications, shedding even partial light on the subject
could allow more-fully-informed future decision-making.271 Perhaps a
paper analyzing two additional groups would add more than any one
sample could. First, researchers could collect responses from a large
sample of community college students, preferably statewide.272 Although
students may not have the same life experiences as non-students, police
may more likely profile or stereotype young people of color during
“social” stops,273 and thus compiling any mass of youth responses may
yield useful insights despite potential sample bias. Next, an organization
such as the local or statewide NAACP may allow a researcher to survey
registered members.274 Such an effort may have an unpredictable
response rate, but mailing or emailing a sufficiently large set of surveys
or using weighting adjustments would at least begin painting a picture of

269. See WHO ATTENDS COMMUNITY COLLEGE?: COMMUNITY COLLEGE STUDENTS COME FROM
BROAD RANGE OF BACKGROUNDS, DATA POINTS, AM. ASS’N OF CMTY. COLLS. (Apr. 2015),
http://www.aacc.nche.edu/Publications/datapoints/Documents/WhoAttendsCC_1_MD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PR7-JC6N] (discussing that many community college students are
“nontraditional,” including single parents and students with disabilities); Bethany Brookshire,
Psychology Is WEIRD: Western College Students Are Not the Best Representatives of Human
Emotion, Behavior, and Sexuality, SLATE (May 8, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/health
_and_science/science/2013/05/weird_psychology_social_science_researchers_rely_too_much_on_
western_college.html [https://perma.cc/7YW4-QP8X] (noting that Western college students differ
from the global population, that people with different socioeconomic backgrounds have different
perceptions of the world around them, and that college students may differ in their responses to
social punishment).
270. See Amato, supra note 267, at 144 (“Researchers obtain convenience samples of children or
adults through community organizations (such as single-parent support groups) or other local
sources. Convenience samples are relatively easy and inexpensive to obtain, but people in these
groups may be atypical in unknown ways.” (emphasis in original)).
271. See Oral Argument at 44, Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) (No. 06-8120) (quoted
in Kessler, supra note 23, at 61 n.60).
272. For a discussion of approaches to sampling community college students, see Richard A.
Rasor & James E. Barr, Survey Sampling of Community College Students: For Better or for Worse,
ANN. CONF. OF THE RES. & PLAN. GRP. FOR CAL. CMTY. COLLS. (1998),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED416932.pdf [https://perma.cc/M752-927E].
273. See Ranjana Natarajan, Racial Profiling Has Destroyed Public Trust in Police. Cops Are
Exploiting
Our
Weak
Laws
Against
It,
WASH. POST
(Dec.
15,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/15/racial-profiling-has-destroyedpublic-trust-in-police-cops-are-exploiting-our-weak-laws-against-it/ [https://perma.cc/37C2-X6R3].
274. Some branches of the NAACP survey members. See, e.g., SGV NAACP Membership
Information Survey, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY NAACP BRANCH #1066 (2016),
http://www.sgvnaacp.org/#!take-our-survey/g36nm [https://perma.cc/P79D-24GH].
A
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this subgroup’s experiences.275 Results from either a youth survey—
preferably one with a substantial number of minority respondents—or an
NAACP survey—preferably one with a substantial number of youth
respondents—could be enlightening, and in the event that both sets of
responses point toward the same conclusion, the judiciary may value
having fresh data to inform an updated standard.276
Research regarding effects on persons with disabilities may prove
even more difficult than the racial or youth sampling issues discussed
above. First, the researcher would need to designate which disability
categories merited investigation; as one potential starting point, the
Social Security Administration lists fourteen disability categories, each
with specific conditions enumerated.277 If a researcher wished to further
narrow the field, perhaps he or she could start with samples targeting the
two conditions (blindness and likely some variant of brittle bones, either
due to osteoporosis or osteogenesis imperfecta) discussed in the
recovery center survey comments.278 The researcher could then assess
whether a significant portion of respondents in the target sample report
discomfort refusing the police.279 Such deeper investigation would
elucidate whether the recovery center qualitative responses uncovered an
important factor or merely a coincidence.
As discussed above,280 researchers may also pursue interviews and
focus groups, as they may prove more fruitful than the basic survey
approach. These face-to-face interactions allow the researcher to ask not
only whether an individual would feel comfortable refusing to interact
with police, but why the person feels that way and what might change
the person’s reaction.281
275. For a discussion of one method for using weighting to adjust for low survey response rates,
see Eric L. Dey, Working with Low Survey Response Rates: The Efficacy of Weighting Adjustments,
38 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 215, 215–27 (1997), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40196243.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2017).
276. See Monahan & Walker, supra note 21.
277. See Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: Listing of Impairments - Adult Listings
(Part A), SOCIAL SECURITY, https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/AdultListings.
htm [https://perma.cc/ENH5-33J9]; Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: Part III - Listing
of Impairments, SOCIAL SECURITY, https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/ bluebook/listingimpairments.htm [https://perma.cc/S427-VX7X] (implying that many unlisted debilitating
conditions may exist, as the Social Security Administration list focuses on “impairments [that] are
permanent or expected to result in death, or the listing includes a specific statement of duration”).
278. See supra section IV.B.2.
279. For a discussion of purposive sampling and its merits, see Crossman, supra note 191.
280. See supra section IV.B.1.
281. See D. Cohen & B. Crabtree, Focus Groups, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION (July
2006), http://www.qualres.org/HomeFocu-3647.html [https://perma.cc/QDJ8-TKA4] (noting that
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The Reasonable Person Standard Could Be Updated to More
Accurately Account for Vulnerabilities, but Switching to an
Emphasis on Officer Conduct Would Produce Better Outcomes

This Comment has reviewed previous studies concerning civilian
response to authority282 and added new data regarding comfort levels
when interacting with police.283 Arguments exist for updating the
existing reasonable person standard to better account for circumstances
faced by certain vulnerable members within the civilian population.284
The courts, however, may be more likely to shape actual behavior by
focusing on officer conduct rather than the supposedly objective notions
of civilian comfort levels.285
1.

Adding Nuance to the Existing Reasonable Person Standard Would
More Accurately Account for Defendants’ Vulnerabilities

Modifying the reasonable person standard by adding exceptions for
categories of people rather than engaging in individual-by-individual
protections would maintain some semblance of objectivity. It is also
easier for social scientists to sample and thus produce research
examining broad (e.g., “all men”) rather than narrow (e.g., “youth of
Pacific-Islander origin”) categories.286 Unfortunately, a large category
such as “the reasonable woman” may create more problems than it
solves.287
The combination of the Kessler study and the recovery center study
indicates a potential argument for differentiating between the reasonable
woman and the reasonable man,288 and some psychological research
focus groups often “explore a topic that does not lend itself to observational techniques (e.g.
attitudes and decision-making)”); Surveys, Focus Groups and Interviews, QUEENSL. GOV’T (June
28, 2016), https://www.business.qld.gov.au/business/starting/market-customer-research/researching
-customers/surveys-focus-groups-interviews [https://perma.cc/C2LL-NMAD] (noting that openended questions “tend to be better suited to qualitative research methods such as focus groups and
interviews where you can ask follow-up questions to get more information”).
282. See supra Part III.
283. See supra Parts IV, V.
284. See, e.g., supra section IV.B.2.
285. See infra section VI.B.2.
286. See Aaron Smith, Problems Associated with Surveying Small Demographic Groups, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/08/12/problems-associatedwith-surveying-small-demographic-groups/ [https://perma.cc/N6KG-5P3D] (discussing the extreme
expense of collecting an adequately large set of responses from an ethnic subpopulation).
287. See supra section II.C.
288. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 84–85; supra section V.B.
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indicates that women may be more prone to feel obligated to comply. 289
But substantial feminist legal scholarship raises criticisms of a
“reasonable woman” standard.290 Kessler’s study notes that, while it may
be “easier for law enforcement officials to know if their actions would
make the reasonable person feel restrained than to know if their actions
make the particular person with whom they are currently dealing feel
that way,”291 courts may nonetheless consider adopting a “reasonable
person of similar age” or “reasonable person of the same gender”
standard.292 Kessler observes that, because the United States Supreme
Court has previously discussed this more granular type of standard in the
context of seizure,293 moving toward consistent implementation would
not constitute a complete reversal of precedent. Courts also have made
modifications to the reasonable person negligence standard—for
example, holding a defendant to varying standards based on the
defendant’s skill level294—and so a precedent for narrowing a reasonable
person standard does exist.295
When one considers the Washington results independent of the
Kessler study, however, the evidence supporting a separate standard
based on any easily identifiable exterior characteristics, even based on
gender, appears weaker.296 The recovery center survey may have shown
females indicating a greater hesitation to interact with the police, but it
featured a small sample of a particular subset of the population.297 The
broader Washington voter survey did not indicate that females are less
comfortable refusing the police than are males.298 In light of the opaque
evidence, if courts opt to modify the existing standard, they may do
better focusing on a few particular vulnerabilities.299
289. Jesse-Justin Cuevas & Tonja Jacobi, The Hidden Psychology of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2180 (2016) (“[A] woman would be more likely than a man
to feel that she should be compliant and helpful, even if she does not want to submit to a search.”).
290. See Cahn, supra note 97, at 1401.
291. Kessler, supra note 23, at 84.
292. Id.
293. Id. (noting discussion of a “twenty-two year old . . . female” within United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
294. See Charles R. Korsmo, Lost in Translation: Law, Economics, and Subjective Standards of
Care in Negligence Law, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 306, 319 (2013) (discussing the law and
economics “standard model” and “inverse model” of injurer capacity).
295. See supra section II.A.
296. See supra section V.B.
297. See supra section IV.B; infra Appendix D.
298. See supra section V.B.
299. See supra section IV.B.2.
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The verbal comments from the recovery center survey300 may suggest
that courts should expand jury instructions concerning disability or
vulnerability. Even without definitive study results, courts have already
established exceptions protecting individuals with disabilities;301
clarifying that disabilities also deserve special consideration within
seizure contexts would be a matter of tidying up existing verbiage. The
courts could maintain the current standard but add a catch-all wrinkle for
recognized disabilities or other special circumstances that place a
defendant in a societally-recognized vulnerable position. Rather than, for
example, changing the standard to assume that the average woman feels
more vulnerable, the courts could continue to refer to the generic
reasonable person but add a line item allowing the jury to account for
individualities.302 Individualities may include disabilities, recent local
violence toward certain minority groups, prejudice against youth, or
whatever particularized vulnerabilities courts choose to consider.303
As an example, one subset of women who may react differently to
perceived threats include those experiencing or recovering from
domestic violence.304 Women in this situation may have reason to be
more fearful than the average woman in a variety of circumstances that
ordinary individuals take for granted.305 Courts have dealt with this in
certain assault or murder cases by allowing expert testimony to explain
to jurors the intricacies of battered-woman syndrome and its effects on
behavior.306 Juries can then evaluate the expert testimony and the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether a female defendant’s choice
seems reasonable in that instance. Scholars have been willing to express
support for the “reasonable woman” standard within a domestic violence
context in other areas of law, and thus using, for example, a “reasonable
woman who has experienced domestic violence” standard in the seizure
context may warrant further consideration.307
Whether a defendant chose to argue membership in a group suffering
300. See supra section IV.B.2.
301. See supra section II.A.
302. See Kessler, supra note 23, at 85.
303. See id.; supra section IV.B.2.
304. See Cahn, supra note 97, at 1401.
305. Jamie Rich, Compass Cards Compromise Women’s Safety and Enable Abusers, BATTERED
WOMEN’S SUPPORT SERVS. (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.bwss.org/compass-cards-compromisewomens-safety-and-enable-abusers/ [https://perma.cc/636H-Y9C3].
306. See generally Emily J. Sack, From the Right of Chastisement to the Criminalization of
Domestic Violence: A Study in Resistance to Effective Policy Reform, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 31
(2009).
307. See supra section II.C.
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from an invisible disability, repeated exposure to race-based violence, a
paranoia diagnosis, or any other particularity, courts could ask the jury
to determine whether they believe the sincerity of the defendant’s claim
or the strength of the group’s propensities. Some may insist that—
perhaps to avoid excessively fact-intensive inquiries or to reduce the
incentive for fabrication—courts must “decline to take [the defendant’s]
personal equation into account”;308 however, this level of fact-finding
would be no more arduous than, for example, asking juries to determine
the level of emotional involvement between a claimant and a victim in a
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim, a charge already
commonly given.309
Perception of personal vulnerability may seem insufficiently objective
as a base standard, but it is no less measureable than the present
“reasonableness” standard.310 When choosing between one
immeasurable standard and another, courts should opt for the choice that
maximizes fairness and broader justice.311
2.

Courts Should Provide Guidance to the “Reasonable Police
Officer” Rather than the “Reasonable Seized Defendant”

Determining what an “average” or “objective” suspect feels when
interacting with the police involves multiple hurdles.312 Providing
guidance designed to directly shape officer behavior, while also
challenging, has a higher likelihood of producing results.313 In particular,
courts often rely on the “reasonable officer” standard, first promulgated
in Graham v. Connor.314
Graham explains that officers must behave as an objectively
reasonable officer would in light of the circumstances known in the
308. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1909).
309. See, e.g., Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 378 (N.J. 1994) (determining that a fiancée was
emotionally close enough to deceased to recover for NIED claim as a spouse would and noting that
courts can deal “with the realities, not simply the legalities, of relationships”).
310. For a discussion of the difficulties in establishing a coherent “reasonable person” standard
based on positive measurements, see Miller & Perry, supra note 108, at 328, 371.
311. Fairness is such an important principle that, despite its arms-length distance from heat-ofthe-moment choices, increasing procedural fairness in the courtroom may reduce the number of
crimes committed. See The Case for Procedural Justice: Fairness as a Crime Prevention Tool,
CMTY. POLICING DISPATCH (Sept. 2013), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/09-2013/fairness
_as_a_crime_prevention_tool.asp [https://perma.cc/G78H-VXAS].
312. See Miller & Perry, supra note 108, at 328, 371.
313. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (prompting concrete changes in police
behavior when taking suspects into custody).
314. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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moment.315 In Graham, the factual record indicated316 that officers
cuffed and placed facedown a man experiencing a diabetic reaction, then
refused to allow him orange juice.317 The Court held that a proper
analysis should focus on the higher standard of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness rather than a due process inquiry to determine whether
the particular officers had malicious intent.318 The Court did not consider
whether the diabetic man behaved rationally, but rather whether the
officers responded reasonably.319
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina320, the Court similarly explored what the
police should have known, rather than what the individual child likely
felt, during in-custody questioning.321 The Court asserts that police
cannot fail to notice and account for how a suspect’s age affects fear
levels and the freedom to walk away.322 Justice Kennedy stated things
plainly:
Though the State and the dissent worry about gradations among
children of different ages, that concern cannot justify ignoring a
child’s age altogether. Just as police officers are competent to
account for other objective circumstances that are a matter of
degree such as the length of questioning or the number of
officers present, so too are they competent to evaluate the effect
of relative age.323
The Court used the word “competent,”324 perhaps indirectly signaling
normative reasons for focusing on police actions rather than suspects’
emotions.
Normative approaches to imposing a “reasonable person” standard
focus on the likelihood (or at least the hope) that court-imposed
standards affect actor behavior in a manner that benefits society.325 Some
assert that “normative definitions are categorically preferable to positive
315. Id. at 395–97.
316. Id. at 388 (“Because the case comes to us from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the entry of a directed verdict for respondents, we take the evidence hereafter noted in the light most
favorable to petitioner.”).
317. Id. at 389.
318. Id. at 398–99.
319. See generally id.
320. 564 U.S. 261 (2001).
321. Id. at 274.
322. Id. at 276.
323. Id. at 279.
324. Id.
325. See generally Miller & Perry, supra note 108.
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definitions” because grossly conflicting outcomes emerge when one
assumes that members of a broad society will conform to a few basic
axioms and act in a logically consistent manner.326
From the normative perspective, then, is the purpose of the existing
reasonable person standard to educate all Americans about how they
should feel during a police interaction? In light of the research regarding
instinctive responses to authority, such court-imposed instruction may
not work.327 If instead the purpose is to protect citizens from overintrusion or optimize officer-civilian interactions, then focusing on the
party who has greater control over the encounter makes more sense.328
The courts may accomplish more by focusing on reasonable police
actions. From an efficiency perspective, the police make up a small
subpopulation329 that already attends police academy and continuing
education sessions. Politeness and fair procedures impact citizens’
perception of police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with police
to solve crimes.330 Thus, encouraging police to maximize the comfort of
conversational partners during social interactions may increase police
productivity in addition to decreasing accusations of unwarranted
seizure.331
Courts using a new “reasonable officer” standard should ask
questions focused on the officer-civilian interaction on a case-by-case
basis—for example, whether officers blocking all the exits to a factory332

326. Id. at 326.
327. See supra Part III.
328. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CMTY. RELATIONS SERV., PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING:
AVOIDING VIOLENCE BETWEEN POLICE AND CITIZENS v (2003), https://www.justice.gov
/archive/crs/pubs/principlesofgoodpolicingfinal092003.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF2Y-BBZR] (“[T]he
police, by virtue of the authority that society vests in them, have overarching responsibility for the
outcome of encounters with citizens.”).
329. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2008, at 1 (June 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
fleo08.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQK8-23C6] (reporting that, as of 2008, federal agencies employed
120,000 full-time officers authorized to make arrests); BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 1
(July 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5RP-K4YW]
(reporting that, as of 2008, state and local law enforcement employed about 765,000 full-time and
44,000 part-time personnel with general arrest powers).
330. See generally Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008).
331. See id.
332. See I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 221 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
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or officers requesting and then retaining identification333 acted in a way
that a reasonable officer having a social interaction would act. Shifting
the inquiry to police choices will signal to officers that, when labeling an
interaction “social,” the officer must choose an approach that reasonably
appears social, rather than assuming it is the suspect’s responsibility to
walk away.334 Encouraging these types of police choices could reduce
confusion, increase perceived legitimacy, and indirectly reduce crime.335
Washington courts already aim to focus on officer behavior to
determine whether a social contact has escalated into a seizure.336 Other
courts, including the United States Supreme Court, should follow
Washington’s lead. Additionally, authors of future Washington opinions
could take greater pains to avoid references to the suspect’s feelings or
expected reaction and instead focus exclusively on the officers’
objective actions.337 Furthermore, in light of demonstrated tendencies to
acquiesce to authority, as shown in the Milgram338 and Bickman339
experiments—and as underscored in one update to the Milgram
experiment in which a subject reported fear even absent any show of
aggression from the overseer340—all courts (and perhaps even
333. See generally Aidan Taft Grano, Casual or Coercive? Retention of Identification in PoliceCitizen Encounters, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1283 (2013) (discussing the split between the Fourth
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit regarding whether retaining a pedestrian’s identification constitutes
seizure).
334. The “free-to-leave” standard arguably instructs civilians on when they should or should not
feel comfort. Observing that a civilian who feels uncomfortable is simply behaving unreasonably
harkens back to one infamous United States Supreme Court decision: Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 551 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“We consider the
underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it.”).
335. See Tyler & Fagan, supra note 330.
336. State v. Young, 135 Wash. 2d 498, 501, 957 P.2d 681, 682 (1998).
337. Compare State v. Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d 656, 665, 222 P.3d 92, 96 (2009) (“Analyzing
this encounter under Washington’s purely objective standard, a reasonable person at the beginning
of the conversation would not have thought [the officer] restrained that person’s freedom of
movement.” (emphasis added)), with id. at 670, 222 P.3d at 98 (“A reasonable person would not
have felt free to leave due to the officer’s display of authority.” (emphasis added)). The first
phrasing focuses on what the officer did, whereas the second phrasing focuses on how a civilian
might have felt about it.
338. See MILGRAM, supra note 125, at 123 (“We have now seen several hundred participants in
the obedience experiment, and we have witnessed a level of obedience to orders that is
disturbing.”).
339. See Bickman, supra note 126, at 47.
340. See Burger, supra note 135.
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legislatures341) may wish to reexamine the show of force necessary in
order for a police officer to have seized a suspect.
When drawing the line between social interactions and seizures,
judges must balance the goals of protecting individual liberty and
allowing police enough leeway to effectively fight crime.342 Previous
attempts to rely on “gut” instincts regarding suspects’ comfort levels
have resulted in strained assumptions that may not reflect average
civilians’ actual attitudes.343 Yet attempts to measure civilian reactions
run into roadblocks due to overestimation of willingness to resist
authority344 as well as difficulties collecting accurate data.345 Putting the
spotlight on objective officer behavior would focus analysis on what
officers may do rather than on what civilians may feel.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
Washington have set a seizure standard without the benefit of robust
social science research.346 Kessler’s 2009 study attempted to shed light
on when the typical person feels comfortable refusing to answer police
questions, and thus when a “real” reasonable person might actually feel
seized—contrasting with courts’ prior assumptions about a reasonable
person’s attitude toward questioning.347 This Comment compares the
Kessler results348 to new data gathered within Washington State. The
new data do not support changing the current standard based on obvious,
externally-identifiable characteristics, with the exception of some
indication that attitudes may differ based on gender.349 Qualitative
information that emerged during the study, however, may point toward
allowing juries to consider indicators of vulnerability for some suspect

341. Cf. David. M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1184 (2014) (discussing a
successful Maryland legislative effort to block unnecessary DNA collection by police).
342. See supra Introduction.
343. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (explaining that a seat-bound
passenger on a long-distance bus ride would feel free to refuse to interact with an immediately
adjacent police officer).
344. See supra Part III.
345. See supra section VI.A. and Part V.
346. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion) (setting a
standard that a person is seized if a reasonable person would not feel free to leave).
347. See supra Part I.
348. See supra Part V.
349. See supra Part V.

15 - Phair.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

SEARCHING FOR THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD

4/5/2017 2:46 PM

473

categories.350 Future research is needed, but researchers will face
difficulties gathering accurate data.351 Courts would do better to clarify
and emphasize the standard for the “reasonable police officer” during a
seizure rather than focusing on the behavior of a seized defendant.352

350. See supra section IV.B.2.
351. See supra section VI.A.
352. See supra section VI.B.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Kessler 2009 Survey Questions
1. You are walking on the sidewalk. A police officer comes up to you
and says, “I have a few questions to ask you.” Assume you do not want
to talk to the officer.
On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate how free you would feel to walk
away without answering or to decline to talk with the police officer.
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5
Not free
to leave or say no

Somewhat free
to leave or say no

Completely free
to leave or say no

2. You are riding the bus. A police officer comes up to you and says, “I
have a few questions to ask you.” Assume you do not want to talk to the
officer.
On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate how free you would feel to walk
away without answering or to decline to talk with the police officer.
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5
Not free
to leave or say no

Somewhat free
to leave or say no

Completely free
to leave or say no

Which sentence best describes your legal rights in each of the above
situations?
1. You have the legal duty to talk with the officer even if you do not
want to.
2. You have a legal duty to be reasonably helpful to the officer, but
may leave in some situations.
3. You have a legal right to ignore the officer, but he may assume you
are guilty of wrongdoing if you do.
4. You have the legal right to refuse to talk with the officer with no
consequence to yourself.
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Please provide the following demographic information:
Age: _______Zip Code: _______
Have you ever been stopped before by a police officer? _____
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Appendix B
Fall 2015 Survey Questions for Telephone Survey and Addiction
Recovery Survey
Thank you for answering a few questions. Your participation is
voluntary, and your identity will be kept completely anonymous.
A. Imagine you are walking on the sidewalk. A police officer comes up
to you and says, “I have a few questions to ask you.” Assume you do not
want to talk to the officer.
On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate how free you would feel to walk
away without answering or to decline to talk with the police officer.
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5
Not free
to leave or say no

Somewhat free
to leave or say no

Completely free
to leave or say no

B. Imagine you are riding the bus. A police officer comes up to you and
says, “I have a few questions to ask you.” Assume you do not want to
talk to the officer.
On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate how free you would feel to walk
away without answering or to decline to talk with the police officer.
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5
Not free
to leave or say no

Somewhat free
to leave or say no

Completely free
to leave or say no

C. Which sentence best describes your legal situation in each of the
above scenarios?
1. You have the legal duty to talk with the officer even if you do not
want to.
2. You have a legal duty to be reasonably helpful to the officer, but
may leave in some situations.
3. You have a legal right to ignore the officer, but he may assume you
are guilty of wrongdoing if you do.
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4. You have the legal right to refuse to talk with the officer with no
consequence to yourself.
Please provide the following demographic information:
Age: _______
Zip Code: ___________
Race/ethnicity: ____________________________
Gender:________
Education (circle one):
Did not finish high school
High school/GED
Some college/vocational school
2-year college degree
4-year college degree
More than 4-year college degree
Other than for a traffic violation, have you ever been stopped by a police
officer? _____
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Appendix C
Telephone Survey of Washington Voters Methodology
The researcher paid Elway Research, Inc. to ask proprietary
questions with wording nearly identical to the questions used in the
Kessler study.353 Elway asked the questions during its statewide
telephone poll, conducted October 13–15, 2015.354 The poll drew from a
pre-selected randomized sample of registered voters from across
Washington State. Live interviewers made the calls, and 28% of calls
went to cell phones. Of the 500 respondents, 54% were female, 46%
were male. Respondents were 31% from King County, 49% from the
remainder of Western Washington, and 20% from Eastern Washington.
The voter sample had very few non-White respondents (87% Caucasian,
compared to 77.7% Caucasian in the Kessler sample355), and only 7% of
respondents were under age thirty-five (compared to 26.7% of
respondents in the fifteen to twenty-four age range in the Kessler
sample356). The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 4.5% at the
95% confidence level.

353

See supra section III.D.
See The Elway Poll, ELWAY RESEARCH, INC., http://www.elwayresearch.com/elwaypoll.html
[https://perma.cc/9GY2-3JES].
355
See Kessler supra note 23, at 73–74.
356
Id.
354
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Appendix D
Recovery Center Survey Methodology
The researcher expected to enter a classroom during a timelimited session, briefly introduce the survey process, pass out a large
number of written questionnaires, and then collect anonymously
completed forms and depart. However, the survey setting proved
different when the researcher entered the facility and observed a large
buffet with clients socializing at spread-out tables. A staff member rang
a bell and called the room to attention, and the researcher explained the
survey. Center clients joined the researcher in a side room a few at a
time. Those who completed the survey returned to the dining area and
encouraged their associates to participate. The researcher offered those
who participated a small dessert (a cookie or piece of candy) as an
incentive.
Calculating the sample size, thirty-seven, simply involved
counting the survey sheets, but the flow of buffet patrons in and out of
the building—and the need to avoid pressuring members of a vulnerable
population—complicated participation rate calculation. The researcher
could not pinpoint exactly how many people in the room heard the initial
announcement or follow-up invitations from their associates. The
researcher received twenty-five responses from approximately fifty
Wednesday buffet patrons and twelve responses from fewer than forty
Friday buffet patrons—partly due to repeat buffet attendees not taking
the survey twice. Thus, during the Friday visit, the response rate of those
eligible to complete the survey was likely 50%, similar to Wednesday’s
rate.

